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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
pital, supra. An unborn child is granted a legal existence for purposes
other than for taking property devised to it. In criminal law, see Lee v.
State (1921), 124 Miss. 398, 86 So. 856; 37 C. J. 347. That afterborn chil-
dren are provided for in divorce decrees see Laumejer v. Laumeier (1924),
237 N. Y. 357, 143 N. E. 219. The furthest extension of the doctrine has
been in permitting a posthumous child to recover damages for the death of
his father caused by the negligence of another. Nelson v. Ry. Co. (1890),
78 Tex. 621, 14 S. W. 1021; Bonnarens v. Ry. Co. (1925), 309 Mo. 65, 273
S. W. 1043. But the courts have been stubbornly giving weight to prece-
dent and refuse to allow recovery for pre-natal injuries.
Some justification for the denying of recovery is found in the practical,
as distinguished from the technical, reasoning. To permit recovery would
undoubtedly give rise to fraudulent litigation, with false and speculative tes-
timony, which the defendant would find difficult to refute. Drobner v.
Peters, supra. The principal case asserts that even to deny recovery for
loss of services will make no material difference, since the jury in awarding
damages to the mother will be sympathetic to her cause. Also consideration
must be given to the problem that damages for loss of services is highly
speculative. This being so the decision can be reconciled with the law of
damages which provides that compensation cannot be based upon a mere
conjectural probability of future loss. Houston Land & Loan Co. v. Texas
Co. (1911), 140 S. W. 818; Wilson v. Weil (1878), 67 Mo. 339.
There can be no quarrel with those decisions which are influenced by the
practical considerations, but those decisions which deny recovery solely on
the technical "nonentity" theory cannot be approved. It is to be hoped that
the problem will be settled on the basis of logic and principle rather than
on stare decisis.
W. F. '37.
Lmn-QuALIw PRrvI.GE=-FAm COMMENT-ACTION FOR LIBEL.-A
newspaper, in its Sunday magazine section, published an article which com-
mented both on the protagonists and the findings in an ecclesiastical trial in
which the plaintiff, a minister, was expelled from the church for alleged
immoral conduct with a woman parishioner. Held, that defendant news-
paper had a qualified privilege to publish an account of the charges, trial,
and findings before the church tribunal; and that it had a right to com-
ment upon true facts, when they were matters of public concern, by stating
inferences and conclusions about them, provided that such statements were
made in good faith and without malice. Warren v. Pulitzer Pub. Co. (Mo.
1934) 78 S. W. (2nd.) 404.
Qualified privilege is available as a defence when the defamatory com-
munication is made in the discharge of some duty, moral or social, and the
inference of malice is nullified by the occasion, depending upon the absence
of actual malice. Shurtleff v. Stevens (1879) 51 Vt. 501; Mo. Pac. Ry. Co.
a'. Richmond (1889) 73 Tex. 568, 11 S. W. 555. The proceedings of the
church are quasi-judicial, and therefore those who complain, or give testi-
mony, or act or vote, or pronounce the result orally or in writing, acting in
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good faith, and within the scope of the authority conferred by this limited
jurisdiction, and not falsely or colorably making such proceedings a pretense
for covering an intended scandal, are protected by the law of qualified priv-
ilege. Farnsworth v. Storrs (1850) 5 Cush. (Mass.) 412. Moreover, the
privilege is not necessarily lost by the publication of the libel or slander to
persons not members of the church, or to the public generally. Farnsworth
v. Storrs, supra; Landis v. Campbell (1883) 79 Mo. 433. A resolution of
censure by a church council, charging a member with violation of the laws
of the church, and with actions injuring its welfare, is privileged, if pub-
lished in good faith, without malice. Over v. Hildebrand (1883) 92 Ind. 19.
Fair comment is the drawing of inferences or of conclusions from true
facts, and it is a defense when the subject matter discussed is of public
interest. Burt v. Newspaper Co. (1891) 154 Mass. 238; 28 N. E. 1; Post
Pub. Co. v. Hallam (C. C. A. 6, 1893) 59 Fed. 530. Literary works are sub-
ject to comment. Dowling v. Livingstone (1896) 108 Mich. 321, 66 N. W.
225. The press has the right to comment upon the conduct of a coroner.
Diener v. Chronicle Pub. Co., (1910) 230 Mo. 613, 132 S. W. 1143. Candi-
dates for public office are subject to comment. Epps v. Duckett (1920) 284
Mo. 132, 223 S. W. 572. Comment on persons prominent in the business,
social, and professional life of the community may be fair. Flanagan v.
Nicholson Pub. Co. (1915) 137 La. 588, 68 So. 964. Burt v. Newspaper Co.,
supra.
Whether fair comment is essentially different from qualified privilege as
a defence in an action of libel is the subject of some confusion in the cases.
According to an early English view, which has been followed by some
courts in the United States, privilege means that a person stands in such
a relation to the facts of the case that he is justified in saying or writing
what would be slanderous or libelous by anyone else; but everyone has a
right to make fair and proper comment, in good faith, and so long as it is
within that limit, it is no libel. Campbell v. Spattiswood (1863) 3 B. and S.
769, 122 Eng. Rep. 288; Morasca v. Item Co. (1910) 126 La. 426, 52 So. 565;
Merrey v. Guardian Printing Co. (1909) 79 N. J. L. 177, 74 Atl. 464. Other
eases have held that fair comment comes within the scope of libel, but that
it is a privilege which is a good defence, in the absence of actual malice.
The distinction between fair comment and qualified privilege is not sharply
drawn in these cases. This view, which has found more favor within Amer-
ican courts, is approved in the instant case. Thomas v. Bradbury (1906) 2
K. B. 627; Diener v. Chronicle Pub. Co., supra; State v. Cox (1927) 318
Mo. 112, 298 S. W. 837; Gott v. Pulsifier (1877) 122 Mass. 235.
Whether fair comment is regarded as being entirely outside the scope
of libel, or whether it is a qualified privilege is unimportant for practical
purposes, since, under either rationale, the defence is defeated by proof of
actual malice. Therefore commnt to be "fair" must be made without malice.
It is arguable that this interpretation by the courts is not cogent, since it
would seem that a comment could be made maliciously, and yet be a "fair"
inference from true facts if judged by objective criteria.
J. L. F. '37.
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